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THE PHILOSOPHER’S STONE 
 
 
 
 
Bleeding the Vat 
By Mark Stahl 
 
  Descartes has a 
problem. He did such a good 
job at separating mind from 
body that when asked to 
resolve their interaction he 
fell back to a biological 
answer. Needless to say his 
answer was less than 
adequate. The challenges 
offered by dualism have yet 
to be resolved and I am going 
to make no attempt to resolve 
them in the writing below. 
What I am going to do is 
propose a way in which we 
could begin looking at these 
challenges in a slightly 
different manner. Let us begin 
simply. 
Hopefully we agree 
that we do not perceive color 
on objects. Physiologically 
speaking our eyes transduce 
waves of light, and we feel as 
if we perceive color directly.  
At the end of this trans-
duction, our mind passes 
judgment on the information 
received: “I recognize this bit 
of information to be color x.” 
This would imply color to be 
a mental attribute of a 
physical object. But where is 
this interpretation taking 
place? Classically we have 
put these mental activities 
within the mind, and we have 
associated the mind with the 
brain, and the brain is 
spatially located within the 
head.  This would imply that 
the mind has a physical 
location, but the mind is not a 
physical entity and therefore 
has no spatial properties.  
When experiencing the 
daisy, and more specifically 
the color of the daisy, I don’t 
see the color in my head. The 
color I am experiencing 
appears to be located ‘out 
there’, outside my body, and 
more appropriately, it seems 
to be attributed to the flower 
itself. But how is this 
possible?  Color is perceived 
in the mind (being a mental 
attribute), and the mind is 
classically associated with the 
brain (which is located in the 
head), therefore any 
observations of color should 
in turn be viewed within the 
head. So why am I seeing 
yellow ‘out there’ and not ‘in 
here’ (in the head)? 
What if we were to 
assume that the mind, our 
consciousness, our 
subjectivity, was not located 
within our head but was 
located ‘outside’ of us, 
‘around’ us?  This could 
easily explain why we are 
able to experience yellow ‘out 
there’. We are directly 
observing our subjectivity of 
a physical phenomenon. But 
before we start trying to 
validate this hypothesis, let’s 
embellish it a little more.   
Imagine a dot in the 
center of a circle, the dot we 
shall call ‘the center of 
relevance’, which is your 
physical body, and the circle 
is your consciousness. It 
should be stated, for clarity’s 
sake, that consciousness is not 
a circle, it is most likely some 
dynamic, oddly shaped, 
polygon with experiential 
blind spots; nevertheless, a 
circle is good enough for our 
purposes. Now let us place 
our daisy within the circle of 
consciousness and represent it 
with a cross. Next draw a 
circle around the cross. This 
represents our subjectivity in 
regards to the physical daisy; 
this is what we directly 
experience.  This also helps 
us clarify how it is we are 
able to have feelings and 
make judgments about 
occurrences outside of our 
range of perception: each 
object is merely another cross 
lying in our range of 
consciousness and wrapped 
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with our subjectivity, which 
in turn we are observing 
(though it should be noted 
that I am not sure exactly as 
to how we directly observe 
these conscious phenomenon, 
I merely assuming that it does 
happen).  
So let us recap the 
process of experiencing the 
yellowness of the daisy’s 
petals. Light (as energy waves 
or particles) shines bright on 
the daisy’s petals and reflects 
off of them.  The reflected 
energy waves are now the 
frequency of yellow within 
the visible spectrum.  Since 
we are observing the daisy, 
our subjectivity is wrapping 
the flower, and hence the 
waves bounce off of the 
petals and shine through our 
subjective filter.  When 
experiencing the yellowness 
of the daisy, we are 
experiencing our subjectivity 
concerning the physical 
object, and not the object 
itself. 
Now we have a 
possible dilemma. Since we 
are directly observing our 
subjectivity in regards to 
physical objects, is it possible 
to trust any experience we 
have of a physical object to be 
true to reality?  At this point, 
being that I am only able to 
experience the world through 
my five senses (and other 
senses if they exist) I would 
have to honestly (albeit 
depressingly) say that any 
experience I have must first 
be considered an interpreta-
tion of true reality since I am 
not completely aware of any 
limitations placed on my 
senses (such as color 
blindness, or partial deafness, 
or many others). So, in order 
to make an honest judgment 
of our experiences, we must 
first accept that what we are 
observing is not what is real. 
So how do we begin, and 
continue understanding the 
physical reality surrounding 
us?   
When a scientist 
proposes a new hypothesis, 
usually in the form of a paper 
in a scientific journal, this 
hypothesis is taken by other 
scientists who make an 
attempt to reproduce the same 
experiment outlined in the 
paper, in hopes of achieving 
the same or, in the case of 
disproving the hypothesis, 
largely differing results. This 
does not happen once, or over 
a short period of time. 
Usually a hypothesis is tested 
more times than I would be 
willing to count before it is 
taken as (at least partial) truth. 
The same goes for any 
observations concerning the 
objective attributes of 
physical objects, such as 
atomic mass.  One scientist 
experimentally acquires the 
data, publishes, and then the 
experiment is reproduced 
many times until a large 
number of individuals within 
the community agree with the 
proposed theory.  This 
provides us with an answer to 
the question how we 
understand the physical 
reality surrounding us. What 
makes the proposal (“that 
what we are observing is not 
what is real”) nice is that this 
is how things are already 
done.  There is no need to 
change how it is we discover 
things about the world.  
 
 
Please Join Us for Discussion 
on Wednesday, March 29 at 
4:30 in Gamble 213. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                    
        
 
                                       
      
                          
   
         
                                     
     
If you have any questions, 
criticisms, or comments, or would 
like to write a brief article for the 
Philosopher’s Stone, please 
contact either Mary Culp or Dr. 
Nordenhaug.  
 
Mary Culp, 
Editor of Philosopher’s Stone 
maryculp6@comcast.net 
 
Dr. Erik Nordenhaug,  
Faculty Advisor 
nordener@mail.armstrong.edu 
For past Stones, visit 
www.thales1.armstrong.edu/pdg  
 
 
